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In 1974 Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly’s published their landmark study, 
Strikes in France, 1830—1968 (Shorter and Tilly, 1974). In it, they forged the 
argument that the strike was “an instrument of working-class political action” 
intended to impress “the political authorities of the land, in the form of either the 
government itself or powerful members of the polity” (p. 343).  In contrast to the 
dominant industrial relations literature – which regarded the strike as a strictly 
industrial action -- Shorter and Tilly were putting together capital, contention and 
states. 
 
This was not the last time the late Charles Tilly would combine capital, 
contention and states. Throughout his long and distinguished career, he saw the 
state as the framework within which contention – even contention aimed at 
private actors – was shaped. And for Tilly, states were never simply mechanisms 
for control of internal coercion, control and commitment: they were part of the 
state system, one in which rulers’ actions within their bailiwicks was shaped by 
what happened outside their control (Tilly 1990). 
   
The same was true of organized labor. Consider, for example, what the French 
labor movement learned from labor movements elsewhere, and how it 
responded to the variations in the international political economy. The enduring 
ritual of le premier mai was a direct diffusion of the American 8-hour day 
movement (Tartakowsky 2005). The great strike wave of 1933-35 was a direct 
response to the international depression of those years (Tilly 1986:326-7). And 
the great political strikes of the years 1946-47 were in the vanguard of the 
international cold war that would freeze the map of Europe into two competing 
parts for the next four decades. Yet Strikes in France left the international class 
struggle in the background. 
 
By the end of the 1970s, Tilly broadened the links he drew between labor 
contention and national politics into a “polity model” (Tilly 1978), which focused 
attention on the political processes that constitute and reconstitute a polity. But 
it was only in another co-authored book, Work Under Capitalism, with Chris Tilly, 
that he returned to the theme of working class contention (1998). But even 
there, the focus is mainly on the intra-national level and the words 
“international” and “globalization” do not even appear in the index. 
  
But as globalization advanced in the 1990s, Tilly was too acute an observer of 
the impact of social change to fail to notice that this process was threatening 
labor’s rights. In an important article in 1995, he would argue that globalization 
threatens labor’s rights because it erodes the powers of the national state2. He 
                                                 
2 “Globalization Threatens Labor’s Rights” was published with responses from prominent labor 
scholars such as Immanuel Wallerstein, Aristide Zolberg, and Lourdes Beneria, and it later helped 
Arrighi and Silver order the literature’s emerging arguments in their path-braking long-view 
studies of globalization (Arrighi and Silver 1999; Silver 2003). 
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concluded: “If workers are to enjoy collective rights in the new world order, they 
will have to invent new strategies at the scale of international capital” (Tilly 
1995b:5). “To the extent that states dissolve, so does citizenship and thereby 
democracy” (Tilly 1995b:22).  
 
The decline of labor movements in the 1990s and into the new century has 
underscored the prescience of Tilly’s 1995 article and the 2008 crisis has 
demonstrated dramatically how closely knit the new global economy has 
become. But there were three lacunae in that article:  
 
 First, most of Tilly’s claims related to labor rights and not to the citizen 
rights that labor and other social groups won to various degrees.  
 
 Second, Tilly’s article elided the differences in capitalist regimes , and their 
government responses to (and even authorship of) globalization’s threats 
to their labor movements. 
 
 Third, Tilly never made clear how the choices of labor organizers can 
either lead to labor’s collapse or help labor to adapt to the changes afoot, 
nor what might predispose union leaderships to making the more 
appropriate choices. We base our analysis below on this critical difference. 
 
We use a Tillian theoretical innovation – the repertoire of contention – to modify 
his substantive conclusions about globalization and labor’s rights (Tilly 2008).  
 
Labor rights and citizen rights: Although organized labor’s primary mode of 
mobilization is at the workplace, supplemented, in some regime types, by unions’ 
association with political parties, labor movements have had long experience 
utilizing members’ rights as citizens. In fact, if we return to the 19th century 
origins of today’s labor movements, we will recall that much of their efforts were 
mobilized on behalf of citizen rights – especially the suffrage, which was 
successfully conquered for most male workers between 1884 in Britain and 1920 
in Sweden  (Rokkan 1970:84-5). Although citizen rights are often labeled 
“bourgeois rights,” labor is no stranger to them. Moreover, labor has often 
combined citizen rights to supplement its labor rights claims in specifically labor 
campaigns. 
 
Regime Type and Labor Claims-Making. Tilly was fundamentally a comparative 
historical sociologist, and often explicitly compared contention in different 
regimes (2006). Yet there is little hint in “Globalization Threaten Labor’s Rights” 
of how different capitalist regimes both respond to globalization and structure 
their labor movements’ strategies, when faced with threats to their rights. We 
believe, and will try to show in the ports sector – how different capitalist regimes 
structure the ways in which organized labor uses different combinations of labor 
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and citizen rights in its defense against the threat of globalization. We will argue 
that even in similarly neo-liberalizing states, labor’s choice to either remain with 
traditional repertoires of contention or adapt to the new regime can make a big 
difference in labor’s capacity to adapt. 
 
In this article, we are less concerned with predicting how effectively domestic 
organized labor will be able to mobilize transnationally than with how 
transnational mobilizations in the face of globalization intersect with the major 
forms of capitalist regime. We will argue that differences in regime type continue 
to structure repertoires of contention and that – even when faced with 
globalization’s threats – workers respond in terms of the particular opportunity 
structures of the regimes in which they live and work, in order to enable the 
withdrawal of their labor power for either their own immediate defense or to 
engage in international solidarity with other workers (Gentile 2009; Tarrow 
2005).  
 
Broadly speaking, in corporatist capitalist states largely use a labor repertoire 
afforded them by the categorical power of their labor rights domain; by contrast, 
in neo-liberal capitalist states, where organized labor holds little categorical 
power, labor movements largely rely on a repertoire enabled by the one main 
rights domain—ie, citizen rights —left available to them in this form of state 
which most approximates the ideal of pro-neo-liberal globalization discourse. We 
operationalize a citizen repertoire and distinguish it from a labor repertoire by 
organized labor’s heavy reliance on performances pertaining to the social 
movement campaign repertoire in order to enable its action: e.g., 
demonstrations, rallies, and court room occupations, and the direct involvement 
of non-union community members for enabling a strike action. By contrast, we 
operationalize the labor repertoire as a more direct withdrawal of labor power, 
using primarily performances such as the strike—from the selective strike to a 
full blockade, the go-slow, work-to-rule, etc.  
 
We begin by returning to Tilly’s landmark article.  We then turn to how union 
movements in two different countries representing two different regimes of 
capitalism – the United States and Sweden – responded to the same 
transnational labor campaign. We continue by showing how differently Australian 
and British national unions responded to their respective regime shifts from 
corporatist to a neo-liberal regimes, with very different results for labor’s capacity 
to adapt to neo-liberal globalization. 
  
I. Tilly, Globalization and Labor’s Rights 
 
Tilly defined “globalization” as “an increase in the geographic range of locally 
consequential social interactions, especially when that increase stretches a 
significant proportion of all interactions across international or intercontinental 
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limits” (1995b:1-2). His primary concern, however, was its impact on labor. With 
the rise of international capital and supranational bodies that strongly reflect the 
interest of capital—the IMF, the World Bank, NAFTA, which had just been 
approved when he wrote, and the WTO—the immediate loser under 
globalization, Tilly held, was the state.  This boded ill for workers engaged in 
conflicts with their class antagonists; for the development of labor movements 
over the past 150 years had been intimately related to the development of the 
national state in which they had become embedded. Without the state’s 
enforcement of rights, and without the state as a site structuring political 
contention, labor seemed doomed to weakening. Tilly also makes a more explicit 
assertion, namely that “[t]o the extent that states dissolve, so does citizenship 
and thereby democracy” (1995b:22). 
 
To students of Tilly’s work, his apparent readiness to relinquish the state tout 
court went against the grain of his long-standing commitment to the idea that 
repertoires of contention are shaped and structured by the national state (Tilly 
1978; 1995a; 2006). Tilly did suggest in his article that workers would need “to 
invent new strategies at the scale of international capital” (1995b:5), and that, in 
a globalized world, the potential future guarantors of worker rights would need 
to be international agencies or consortia of states. But with an uncharacteristic 
pessimism about peoples’ ability to resist and influence large-scale processes, he 
cast an eye around the world of 1995 to find that such new strategies were not 
emerging. Instead, he observed that labor appeared to be turning to 
protectionism, rather than to international solidarity.   
 
A lot has happened in transnational politics since 1995. But much of it supports 
Tilly’s fear of globalization threatening labor’s rights. In the United States, the 
mobilization of the labor movement against the Seattle WTO Ministerial in 1999 
quickly subsided and was at heart protectionist and, after 9/11, organized labor 
defected from its short-lived participation in global justice coalitions  (Hadden 
and Tarrow 2007). In Western Europe, despite the presence of the European 
Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) at the heart of the EU, there has been limited 
evidence of labor’s capacity to mobilize across borders. On the global scene, the 
ICFTU has been unable to construct an international consensus and sustained 
campaign on fair labor standards. 
 
But the decade since Seattle causes us to moderate Tilly’s fear that the state was 
eroding in the face of globalization and its institutional avatars.  Consider these 
examples: 
 
 In Latin America and elsewhere, the so-called “Washington Consensus” 
that appeared to be eroding labor rights in the 1990s was cracked by the 
election of a wave of new anti-neo-liberal governments (Cleary 2006). 
Although much was made of the “race to the bottom” in the late 1990s, 
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Latin Americanists have shown that institutional channels exist to protect 
labor’s rights (Compa 2001; Kay 2005; Murillo and Schrank 2005). 
  
 In Belgium, the closure of Renault’s Vilvoorde plant demonstrated that in 
specific instances, organized labor can mobilize across borders and even 
gain the support of the media and of national political elites (Lagneau and 
Lefebure 2001).  
 
 In Europe in general, elements of organized labor have played an 
important part in the unemployed workers’ marches (Balme, Chabanet 
and Wright 2001) and in the Global and European Social Forums (della 
Porta, ed., 2007), and even the ETUC has begun to come out of its 
protective shell to participate in transnational campaigns against EU 
directives (Parks 2008: ch. 6; Erne 2008). 
 
 In South Africa the powerful labor movement, COSATU, took effective 
action to block the unloading of a shipload of Chinese weapons destined 
for Zimbabwe and has been pressuring the ANC government to reduce its 
support for the Mugabe regime.  
 
 And crossing the Atlantic, large British and American unions recently 
announced the formation of “Workers Uniting,” which will represent more 
than 2.8 million workers in the steel, paper, oil, health care and 
transportation industries (NY Times, 3 July 2008:3).  
 
It is too soon to tell but there may well be a transnational Polanyian 
countermovement in progress against the assaults of globalization (Caporaso and 
Tarrow 2009). 
 
II. Regime Types and Responses to Neo-liberal Globalization 
 
But what form will this countermovement take, to the extent that we can 
observe it, and how will it dovetail with the varieties of capitalist regimes in the 
world today? We suggest, building on the work of political economists Esping-
Andersen (1996), Crouch and Streeck (1997; 2006), Hall and Soskice (2001), 
Pontusson (2005), Traxler (1995), Huber and Stephens (2001), and Frege and 
Kelly (2004), that neo-liberal transformations have not been sweeping or 
uniform, and, further, that they have been refracted by historical legacies of 
rights domains and contemporary domestic struggles. Moreover, we note the 
recent strengthening of organized labor’s categorical power in some southern 
European states through new political exchange processes (Pizzorno 1978) that 
had long been deemed a difficult if not impossible development there, but where 
instead new pacts between union movements, employers, and governments 
have been established to foster greater national competitiveness (Rhodes 2001, 
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2003; Ferner and Hyman 1998; Regalia 2003; Regini 2000, 2003; Regalia and 
Regini 1997; Baccaro 2002). 
 
In short, many capitalist regimes, though changing in response to globalization, 
have been loathe to see workers’ labor rights abridged, while some in southern 
Europe have even moved towards a stronger categorization of labor. By contrast, 
radically neo-liberalising government elites, such as those in Great Britain since 
the Prime Ministership of Margaret Thatcher and Australia since that of John 
Howard began, have worked hard to foster regime change from a corporatist to 
a neo-liberal regime of capitalism, and have done so by politically and 
institutionally decategorizing organized labor and its historically built labor rights 
domain from the capitalist state. 
 
What does this have to do with globalization? Only this: that in responding to the 
threats of globalization, labor movements can choose among a panoply of forms 
of contention, drawing on the domain of rights –whether citizen or labor rights -- 
that offers them greater opportunity. Moreover, contrary to the expectations of 
the “Race to the Bottom” thesis that Tilly specified in “Globalization Threatens 
Labor’s Rights”, our research shows that it is precisely in radically neo-liberalising 
regimes that recent campaigns demonstrate organized labor’s capacity to draw 
upon that most domestically embedded of rights domains—citizen rights—to 
survive the onslaught.  
 
Let us first put this in the most general historical terms. When organized labor 
unions first began to mobilize at a national scale in the nineteenth century, 
organizers sought two kinds of rights and forms of categorical recognition: 
strictly labor rights, such as the right to organize, to engage in state-regulated 
collective bargaining, to seniority and various welfare arrangements which 
encompassed T.H. Marshall’s “social rights” (Marshall 1950); and citizen rights, 
most of which labor shared with other classes and which encompass Marshall’s 
“civil” and “political” rights. These areas of rights—labor rights and citizen 
rights—constituted institutionally distinct domains of domestically-rooted rights.  
 
Workers’ citizen rights – or at least alliances with citizens from other classes – 
have not been ignored. In the burgeoning literature on “social movement 
unionism”, community embeddedness and alliances with non-labor organizations 
and movements have taken centre stage in explaining union revitalization. For 
example, in North America the “Justice for Janitors” campaign by the Service 
Employees International Union, similar campaigns by the Hotel and Restaurant 
Employees International Union, and the victory of the Sweeney ticket in national 
union elections have all been seen as markers of the growth of social movement 
unionism (Moody 1997, 1998; Waterman 1998; Seidman 1994; Johnson 1994; 
Turner, Katz and Hurd 2001; Milkman and Voss 2004; Dreiling 2001; Dreiling and 
Robinson 1998). This cluster of strategic innovations includes: unions’ 
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sustenance by local communities; the adoption of progressive political agendas 
ranging from community child care to anti-war mobilization; and a propensity to 
form coalitions with social movements committed to such agendas. 
 
But the use of citizen rights goes beyond the progressive thrust of social 
movement unionism and its universalizing expectations. In the USA, unions as 
ideologically disparate as the West Coast’s International Longshore and 
Warehouse Union and the conservative East Coast’s International 
Longshoremans’ Association (Kimeldorf 1988) rely heavily on citizen rights and 
alliances with citizens in order to conduct their actions.  Yet reliance on citizen 
rights is not universal. In Sweden, neither the social democratic transport union 
nor the anarcho-syndicalist dockers’ union utilize citizen rights and alliances to 
engage in action. Instead, they rely entirely on their labor rights. And in 
Australia, we found a shift of strategies employing, successively, labor and citizen 
rights strategies. 
 
How can we explain this difference? Although both labor and citizen rights are 
available in all OECD regimes, we argue that the density of labor’s political and 
institutional categorisation varies significantly by capitalist regime type3: 
 
 Neo-liberal regimes greatly restrict labor rights both politically and 
institutionally; consequently, unions in such regimes tend to rely heavily 
on their citizen rights and on alliances with other citizens to defend their 
interests and engage in international labor solidarity; 
 
 Corporatist regimes strongly categorize labor rights politically and 
institutionally; consequently unions in such regimes rely on their labor 
rights and on alliances with other unions to defend their rights and 
engage in international labor solidarity; 
 
                                                 
3 Our typology of regimes of capitalism is similar to that of the Varieties of Capitalism School, but 
not identical. This difference is because it was developed using labor-focused variables rather 
than capital-focused variables: e.g., ‘bargaining coverage’ which captures ‘labor-related 
institutional density’, and ‘political exchange’ processes, as conceived by Pizzorno (1978) in his 
classic book during the 1970s corporatism debate. As such, the typology resembles more the 
typology and classification of states by scholars of the welfare state, which aptly focus on social 
rights and noted the peculiar strength and organizational capacity of labor in Antipodean states 
(Huber and Stephens 2001; Castles 1993; Castles 2004; Esping-Andersen 1999). Our regimes of 
capitalism are broadly two, the neo-liberal and the corporatist-capitalist regime, though, for 
purposes not directly related to this paper, we also distinguish four sub-clusters of corporatist 
regimes: the Social Partnership (e.g., Germany), the Social Democratic (e.g., Sweden), the 
Antipodean (Australia until 1997 and New Zealand until 1990), and the New Corporatist (e.g., 
Italy). For details, see Gentile 2009. 
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 Unions in countries in transition from a corporatist to a neo-liberal regime 
tend to demonstrate a shift from strictly labor rights to the employment of 
citizen rights. 
 
By tracing the repertoires, categories, and rights domains utilized by organized 
labor in different types of capitalist regimes, we can show how organized labor 
utilizes domestic opportunity structures according to their comparative 
categorical power in different types of capitalist regimes. We choose the conflicts 
of port workers against their employers for comparison, first because port work 
is  on the cutting edge of the domestic and international markets, and hence is 
highly exposed to the threats of globalization. If Tilly’s 1995 argument were to 
hold, we would expect to see port worker unions utilizing similar repertoires and 
rights domains across different regimes during the same campaign; and we 
would not expect to see a shift in a port union’s repertoire and prominently used 
rights domain when a regime changes from a corporatist to a neo-liberal regime. 
Second, as uniformly strong unions across a universe of OECD organized 
workers, port worker unions are also among the first to be targeted by neo-
liberalising governments and interested elites of capital intent on regime change. 
Thus, as vanguard unions, their successes and failures are instructive of the 
strategic choices that best and least serve labor, while detailed ethnographic 
investigation can help us trace the process through which those choices are 
made.  
 
III. Dock Workers’ Transnational Campaigns 
 
Across the globe, port workers have suffered greatly from the impact of the 
internationalization of ship line ownership, the growth of ‘global port operators’, 
and greater concentration of port service ownership (Dombois and Heseler 
2000).  But because they are connected through the ships they service to port 
workers in other countries and increasingly the same port operators, they have 
considerable incentive to mobilize transnationally. Yet even these most globally-
linked workers, we will show, are directly embedded in the political opportunity 
structures of states in different capitalist regimes. As a result, when faced by a 
common transnational campaign, they respond by using different repertoires. 
And when a state undergoes regime change, port workers’ change their 
repertoire to increase their likelihood of success in the new regime. Moroever, 
the repertoire that best serves labor in a neo-liberal as opposed to a corporatist 
regime is drawn from that most state-defining of rights domains: the citizen 
domain. 
 
The episodes we will use to demonstrate these variations are, first, the response 
of port workers on the USA’s West and East Coasts, and in Sweden to the 
transnational campaign triggered by the Liverpool Dockers’ efforts to gain their 
reinstatement. In these two countries, representing two different capitalist 
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regimes—the neo-liberal and the corporatist—we will see two different 
repertoires used for the same campaign4. Second, we will test the hypothesis 
that links repertoires to regimes on a separate campaign, the MUA-Patrick 
dispute in Australia. But we will also show that labor unions are not simply the 
slaves of political opportunities; opportunities must be perceived and seized in 
order to guide union strategy to success.  
 
We begin with the local campaign of the Liverpool Dockers who triggered a 
transnational mobilization of dockers5 around the world.  
 
A. The Liverpool Dockers’ Campaign for Reinstatement 
 
When, in 1995, 500 Liverpool Dockers employed by the Mersey Docks and 
Harbour Co. (MDHC) refused to cross a picket line by dismissed Torside workers, 
they met the wrath of the Thatcher government’s labor de-categorizing 
revolution. Now an illegal practice, their “secondary boycott” brought about their 
mass dismissal and threatened their union, the Transport and General Workers 
Union (TGWU), with bankruptcy if it were to declare its official support for the 
Dockers’ action. That total closure to opportunity spurred the Dockers, their 
wives, and supporters to organize a transnational campaign to, on one hand, 
pressure the MDHC along its trade routes, and, on the other, push their union to 
find solutions to the post-Thatcher constraints it found itself with and to muster 
concerted domestic and international support for the Dockers’ full reinstatement. 
 
By various mechanisms, the Liverpool Dockers constructed a transnational 
network of dockers and organized two historic international days of action: They 
toured ports with direct trading links to Liverpool to publicly appeal to their 
counterparts, with whose support they at times engaged in direct action against 
Liverpool-bound ships; they organized conferences of port workers around the 
world to take stock of their common grievances and make common cause of the 
Liverpool dispute; they reactivated networks of European dockers from struggles 
they had long ago been involved in and they drew on their solidarity credit from 
those struggles; they elicited the brokerage of sympathetic political activists in 
countries where they could not initially reach the pertinent union and they 
                                                 
4 We further note that the episodes of solidarity with Liverpool that have been selected are drawn 
from a pool of episodes that are independent of the Liverpool Dockers’ First International Day of 
Action in January 1997, which was supported by the International Transport Workers Federation. 
This controls against possible ‘labor INGO effect’ on the actions used.  
5 Port workers have national-culturally specific nouns. Britain normally refers to them as ‘dockers’, 
the USA and Canada as ‘longshore workers’ or ‘longshoremen’, and Australia as ‘wharfies’. Away 
from the English-speaking world, there are also differences, including differences among port 
workers themselves e.g., in Italy between ‘portuali’ (those with primarily a craft unionism identity 
based on the former port-level syndicalist structure, the Compagnia Portuale) and ‘lavoratori 
portuale’ (those with a more recently developed industrial union identity following the post 1990s 
port reforms that privatized the former Compagnie and created multiple employers in each port). 
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further elicited the brokerage of sympathetic unions in the International 
Transport Workers Federation (ITF), which had been restrained by the TGWU 
from organising an international campaign; they signalled their (Irish) cultural 
affinity to a conservative New York union leadership that was not normally 
disposed to international solidarity activities; and, through secondary networking, 
they dispatched ‘Women of the Waterfront’ to Open World and other conferences 
to rally support for their cause in non-labor circles.  
 
There were commonalities in the responses of port workers around the world to 
the mobilization launched by the Liverpool dockers—letters of support, 
donations, resolutions. But in responding to this call for solidarity, the different 
political opportunity structures of different groups of workers deeply influenced 
the repertoires of contention they employed. In neo-liberal USA, West and East 
Coast port workers responded to the conflict by relying on their civil rights under 
the U.S. Constitution and on related state legislation, while in corporatist 
Sweden, Gothenborg’s dockers utilized their legal right to conduct on-going 
solidarity boycotts of the Liverpool-loaded Atlantic Container Line (ACL). With 
both countries each featuring two unions with disparate ideologies, we will also 
show that the repertoires were regime-based regardless of union ideology.  
 
B. Using Citizen Rights on the American West Coast 
 
In September 1997, Oakland port union activists from the International 
Longshore and Warehouse Union6 (ILWU) noted the pending arrival of a ship 
from Thamesport. Since their meetings with the Liverpool Dockers at the 
Liverpool conferences and the Dockers’ tour of the USA, the activists had been 
on the look out for ships from Liverpool, only to find that the West Coast of the 
USA had no direct trade link to it. But when the activists asked the Dockers and 
their internet-operating supporters about the Neptune Jade, their search was 
over: MDHC had newly developing interests in Thamesport, making the ship a 
‘legitimate target’ for displays of solidarity. As militants and members of many 
social and political groups, Oakland’s ILWU activists mobilized their networks for 
a picket to meet the ship at port. Those ILWU unionists who participated in the 
picket were not on duty at the time; while those who were, focused on the one 
legal provision that (indirectly) allowed them scope for supporting a blockade: 
their health and safety rights.  
 
The community picket, together with the unionized workers’ refusal to cross it, 
succeeded in keeping the Neptune Jade off the coast for days. When the ship 
ventured northwards along the US and Canadian coast to find a new port to 
unload its tainted cargo, it was met with the same action, eventually forcing it to 
                                                 
6 “International” in this and many North American cases refers to a bi-national union, i.e., across 
the USA and Canada, rather to an international labor organization or trade union secretariat. 
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cross the Pacific Ocean to Japan. But in Japan, its targeted cargo was outright 
blockaded. The ship was eventually sold and renamed. 
 
The longshore workers’ employers in the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) 
pressed hard with legal suits, but not against the ILWU. Rather, the PMA 
pursued individuals within it, and those union sustaining organizations on the 
community picket that the PMA had identified by their banners. The core suits 
focussed on an ILWU-IBU member, Robert Irminger, who had captained the 
picket while off work, and on ILWU Business Agent, Jack Heyman, who had 
handed out leaflets to the longshore workers to inform them of the picketers’ 
grievances and of their own health and safety provisions. 
 
Heyman’s union-backed defense was successfully constructed on the basis of 
California’s anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation law, which 
strongly upheld the Bill of Rights-related protection of free speech, expression, 
and assembly. A defense based on this legal provision, we note, required that 
Heyman’s (labor) lawyers showed that the specific expressions of his actions, 
i.e., picketing and handbilling, were free speech activities that were protected by 
state and federal constitutions and well established by Supreme Court decisions 
in previous civil rights cases. Following the success of this defense, Heyman then 
began a law suit against the PMA for having attempted to deny him his 
Constitutional rights to free speech!  
 
Irminger’s defense, though based on the same roots, was more complex for, the 
PMA claimed, Irminger had violated a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). The 
court generally agreed with the PMA, but ruled that the violation was sufficiently 
minor and could be settled by Irminger claiming “no contest” and accepting a 
one-day suspended sentence. But the PMA—with its eye on obtaining a 
permanent injunction against the union—smelled blood in the verdict and 
refused to settle unless Irminger were also to name all the individuals and 
organizations who had in any way been involved in the picket. But though the 
case was against individual-citizen, Irminger, the PMA also obtained a court 
order against the ILWU, demanding that the union produced all documents and 
records of communications that in any way concerned the blockade. 
 
The union was far from new to the task of defending itself on the basis of 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech and freedom of conscience7; but an 
injunction to produce all documents was a challenge that it was not sure it could 
                                                 
7 Historical tracing of the ILWU’s repertoire shows that, in this labor-decategorizing state of old, 
the USA, a citizen-based repertoire was in evidence from the years of the union’s foundation: A 
citizen repertoire was used to protest Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia and Imperial Japan’s 
invasion of Manchuria in the 1930s; and it deepened with the rise of the innovating American 
Civil Rights Movement in the 1950s and 1960, and with an impressive array of campaigns against 
Apartheid and labor repression in Central America in the 1970s and 1980s. 
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meet easily. The challenge, however, was met: When the union president, Brian 
McWilliams, fielded his legal department for advice, the union’s editor-journalist 
chanced upon the meeting and was welcomed to contribute to the discussion. 
Somewhat amused by the gravitas of the discussion, Steve Stallone informed 
McWilliams and the lawyer that he had taken possession of the relevant 
documents for the purpose of writing a series of articles on the Neptune Jade for 
the union’s newspaper, The Dispatcher, and that California’s Shield Act, which 
extended federal constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, accorded 
him, as a journalist, , qualified privilege. The union’s lawyer was not familiar with 
this law, but was certainly happy to investigate it. A few hours later, he returned 
with a recommendation that the Shield Act form the basis of the union’s defense. 
McWilliams was delighted to approve the strategy and to even have the union 
“hat-switch” to a new organizational category: that of publisher. The union 
subsequently claimed—and the court agreed—that, as a publisher of a registered 
newspaper, the ILWU had the right to immunity from an order to produce its 
organizational documents. 
 
In sum, the ILWU innovated around its citizen repertoire and trumped the PMA’s 
attempt to bring the union to heel when, first, its leadership opened itself up to 
the advise of an insider to the union with a long history of civil activism—in this 
case for press freedoms. Second, this openness led to an innovation in the 
ILWU’s long-standing citizen repertoire that further explored the citizen rights 
domain of the USA and the state of California, in the course of which the union 
discovered for itself another protective category to utilise—that of publisher. 
 
Throughout the year-long Neptune Jade campaign, other, more familiar 
performances from the citizen repertoire were also utilized: union members and 
community supporters demonstrated in front of the court houses and employers’ 
officers; they rallied in downtown San Francisco; and prominent citizens, such as 
former Governor and then Mayor-Elect of Oakland, Jerry Brown addressed the 
demonstrations and provided a letter to the union defense team declaring that 
he too had walked the line for Liverpool against the Neptune Jade. Together they 
all rallied behind the slogan: “Free Speech is Labor’s Right”. 
 
Such community momentum and broad frames, followed by court room 
successes meant that the union could finally threaten to use workers’ ultimate 
weapon, the full strike, despite the strict bans on striking outside of bargaining 
periods and even then for strictly contract bargaining purposes. For Irminger’s 
had been the most ominous case during this long campaign and he seriously 
faced the prospect of imprisonment if the court were to order him to ‘name 
names’—something which he had no intention of doing as a matter of principle. 
But the year-long citizen campaign had now changed the balance of power.The 
PMA had won little up to this point, and, indeed, had only faced intensified and 
broader mobilization as more and more social groups joined the Neptune Jade 
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campaign to defend civil liberties and denounce the PMA’s “McCarthyite tactics” . 
The union leadership thus decided to issue the credible threat of a West Coast 
port shutdown on the day of Irminger’s court hearing if the PMA were not to 
drop the case. 
 
Shortly before Irminger’s case came to court, the ILWU and the PMA entered 
serious and direct discussions. Brian McWilliams and the union’s Coast 
Committee made clear that unless the Irminger case was dropped, the whole 
Neptune Jade affair would create martyrs and engender a bitterness that would 
haunt the upcoming negotiations and indeed many more to come. Moreover, 
McWilliams told the PMA that on the day of Irminger’s trial, he would shut down 
the whole west coast of North America, including Canada, which was a part of 
the union, and would do so in defense of Irminger and of the Bill of Rights. 
 
Faced with the massive financial pain, organizational mayhem, and public 
relations disaster that a coast-wide shutdown in defense of citizen rights would 
ensure, alongside a published legal case that would remind the legal world for 
generations to come of the PMA’s denial of rights to one citizen worker should 
Heyman’s counter-suit against the PMA proceed, the PMA dropped its case 
against Irminger and other unrelated cases against the union in exchange for 
Heyman dropping his counter-suit. 
 
The actions in solidarity with Liverpool, and the ensuing campaign to defend 
those actions were a victory for the union, enabled by a repertoire drawn from 
the liberal democratic rights domain. 
 
C. From West to East Coast 
 
But the famously progressive ILWU (Kimeldorf 1988; Wellman 1995) was not the 
only port union in the USA to support Liverpool. The equally famous conservative 
union of the east coast, the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA), also 
joined the world actions—early, and to produce the most effective of solidarity 
actions for Liverpool. For our purposes, we note that their actions underscored 
that the citizen repertoire holds in neo-liberal USA regardless of ideology. 
 
Invited to tour the East Coast ports by the ILA President in 1996, the Liverpool 
Dockers, upon arrival in the USA, were informed by their activist escorts that 
American workers are banned from secondary boycotts, but that they 
nevertheless have the right as individual citizens to the freedom of conscience 
not to cross a community picket line. Following their initial shock at the thought 
of organizing pickets in a country and port where they knew neither the workers 
nor the police, the Liverpool Dockers put their trust in their new friends and 
steeled themselves to try. First, they set up three-men pickets in New York, then 
Baltimore and even further down the coast, as they chased a ship of their 
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employer’s largest customer, the Atlantic Container Line (ACL), and appealed to 
the on-duty ILA workers not to cross their picket. The ILA workers refused to 
cross, again on health and safety grounds, while the union was at hand with civil 
libertarian lawyers to help the Dockers with their subsequent injunction.  Those 
solidarity actions by a most conservative and top-heavy union produced for 
Liverpool its most important single result during the first part of their campaign: 
ACL pulled out of Liverpool and discussions between the Dockers’ union and 
employer were more earnestly resumed. Achieved, again, by resort to a citizen 
repertoire. 
 
To summarize: In responding to the Liverpool lockout, American longshore 
activists of disparate ideological traditions relied, first, on external allies and, at 
times, on their own workers-as-citizens when off duty to set up a community 
picket against Liverpool-associated ships that the on-duty longshoremen could 
then refuse to cross on grounds of health and safety regulations. Second, where 
and when sued, they relied on their First Amendment rights as citizens to defend 
themselves. 
 
D. Labor rights in Sweden 
 
Scoring high on Esping-Andersen’s measure for social rights, and indeed 
classified by all major typologies of OECD political economies as a “Coordinated 
Market Economy”,8 Sweden is a particularly apt case for comparison because it 
has been considered the standard bearer not only of corporatist bargaining 
arrangements, but of corporatism in a highly internationalized, open trading 
environment (Katzenstein 1985; Huber and Stephens 2001). Further, like the 
USA, Sweden has two port unions that are organisationally and ideologically 
disparate. 
  
The Swedish Dockers Union (SDU) organizes just over half of Sweden’s dockers, 
but closer to 70% in the country’s largest port, Gothenburg. The Swedish 
Transport Workers Union (STWU), organizes the other half and is the owner of 
the national contract9. Though the two unions are not as far apart ideologically 
as the two American unions, the STWU and the SDU do nevertheless differ 
ideologically with respect to Social Democratic hegemony in Sweden, and in their 
democratic constitutions and practices. The STWU is affiliated to the 
Landsorganisationen Sverige (LO) and is associated with the Social Democratic 
Party. It is therefore part of the strong tradition of social democratic corporatism, 
and relies on professional, appointed leaderships. The SDU is a breakaway rank-
and-file union that was established in 1972, defining itself against corporatist 
political structures and practices, and by its participatory democratic constitution, 
                                                 
8 In Pontusson’s schema, ‘Social Market Economy’. 
9 Swedish labor law permits only one union to sign a contract, and then provides for the 
extension of that contract to all workers in the industry.  
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featuring direct rank-and-file control of all organizational decisions, and high 
leadership accountability. While its founding leaders and all subsequent ones at 
both national and local levels have been an eclectic mix of Communist Party, 
Centre (Farmers) Party, Social Democratic Party and no-party members, its 
rebellious emergence from the STWU and its bitter battles with the STWU and 
the LO for the national contract have fostered an anarcho-syndicalist culture in 
practice (see Gentile 2006 for a brief history of the union). 
 
The Liverpool dockers had only historically distant connections with Sweden, but 
with ACL’s cross-Atlantic traffic through Liverpool ending in Gothenburg, support 
from the country was as high a priority as was the USA. Their first invitation to 
Sweden was issued early in the dispute by a group of Trotskyist activists external 
to the union who had heard of Liverpool through their English party comrades. 
Once they brought the Liverpool Dockers to Sweden at the end of 1995, the 
activists contacted left union activist, Bo Johannson, in the port of Gothenburg, 
and the SDU’s then-head of its International Affairs, Bjorn Borg, based in 
Stockholm.  
 
The union was immediately interested in meeting with the Liverpudlians and 
facilitating visits to rank and file messes in a number of ports. These messes 
were shared by both STWU and SDU members. The SDU rank and file voted to 
engage in sympathy actions and its officials sent due notice to the Swedish 
Harbour Association announcing a 24 hour blockade on all ACL containers to and 
from Liverpool in all ports, plus 12 hour delays on all ACL vessels arriving at the 
strategically important Gothenburg. 
 
Such concerted and publicly declared action was not problematic for the Swedes, 
because the Swedish constitution guarantees the right to association, and 
Swedish labor law, reaffirmed by labor court decisions, distinguishes between 
solidarity and political strikes, allowing the former and banning the later10. A 
solidarity boycott is defined as one that is of an industrial nature, for example, 
one that involves workers without a contract or a matter arising out of an official 
                                                 
10 The Swedes were to discover the Social Democratic limits of their solidarity fostering laws 
during the Campaign against the EU Port Services Directive, early this century. Strike action 
during this campaign was legally deemed a ‘political strike’, which is banned in Sweden. Both 
unions managed a couple of hours of stoppages during one international day of action against 
the Directive, but largely because their employers were themselves opposed to the Directive and 
signaled an OK to the STWU and SDU to proceed with limited actions without fear of litigation. 
When the SDU tried to conduct a second round of strikes some weeks later, however, it found 
itself, on one hand, in court against the employers, and, on the other, with a STWU (ports) 
leadership circular, No. 216/2001, to all STWU members, instructing them to do any work 
refused by striking SDU members if asked to do so by their management. The scabbing did not 
occur, however, due to the fact that the STWU rank and file knew that such an act would have 
provoked violence on the docks—certainly the SDU members were prepared to test their 
competitors’ swimming skills (in iced water if necessary) should they have tried to take their 
work. 
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dispute, and the provision extends to international disputes. While controversy 
over officialness lay at the heart of the Liverpool dispute, Swedish employers did 
not challenge the SDU's view of the dispute’s legitimacy. The boycott extended 
from the end of 1995 until ACL left Liverpool mid-1996; and it resumed a month 
later, the moment the now frequent visitors and writers from Liverpool to their 
new comrades in Gothenburg communicated that ACL had returned.  
 
While the boycott was SDU-led, the STWU’s workers also participated, and the 
STWU leadership, though luke-warm about the Liverpool dispute, did not try to 
prevent it. In fact, early in the Liverpool campaign, the STWU’s leadership visited 
Liverpool, met with and addressed the dockers, and made financial donations. 
The STWU leadership did ensure, however, that it visited on an occasion 
separate from the Liverpool Conferences, so as to avoid participating in an 
international event alongside its national competitor. For its part, the STWU rank 
and file was highly exposed to the SDU’s discussions and meetings about 
Liverpool and with the Liverpudlians, because they shared the same workers’ 
dispatch hall in each port. They joined the blockade without quibbles or qualms. 
 
With respect to external allies, however, none were apparent in the conduct of 
the actual boycott by either union. Once the contact was made and the decision 
taken by Sweden’s dockers to support Liverpool, the strong pro-solidarity legal 
environment permitted the workers to withdraw their labor power on their own. 
To be sure, the SDU organized and hosted many public events over the two year 
campaign: in April 1996, it invited the Liverpudlians as special guest speakers to 
its National Congress; the core left activists in Gothenburg, led by Bo Johansson, 
organized a chain of cultural and fundraising events over the next two years, 
including a Gothenburg Gala for Liverpool featuring high profile performers; and 
the activists arranged the dedication of one of the Maoist KPML(r)’s annual peace 
races to Liverpool. 
 
But these activities were not instrumentally related to the conduct of the 
blockade. They served to raise awareness and sympathy among the Swedish 
dockers and the various left activists that attended; they were a platform from 
which to raise money for Liverpool; and indeed, they helped construct strong 
transnational friendships that have survived the campaign. But unlike the US 
case, those alliances were not instrumentally integral to the boycott as action. 
The dockers blockaded the ship as ‘workers’ utilizing the strong, labor 
categorising laws of social democratic corporatist Sweden. 
 
IV. Adapting And Failing to Adapt  Repertoires 
 
Two other cases help us to round out both the empirical and the theoretical 
picture we have drawn. For while the United States and Sweden reflect basically 
stable frameworks– neo-liberal in the first case and corporatist in the second – 
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the post-1980s period has seen significant cases of regime change from a 
corporatist to neo-liberal regime. In these cases, we should see a shift in labor 
repertoires—away from a traditional recourse to labor rights and towards the 
enhanced use of citizen rights—among those union movements and unions that 
survive regime change. But we also see labor union choices, some of which have 
adapted better than others to the shift to neo-liberalism. As we will see in this 
final section, Australian union leaders adapted with alacrity, while Britain’s were 
loathe to adapt their traditional labor rights repertoires to the new conditions of 
Thatcherite neo-liberalism. 
 
A. Adapting Repertoires  in Australia 
 
As the Liverpool episode was reaching its end, the Australian state was being 
violently torn from its peculiar corporatist roots to a neo-liberal regime modeled 
in many particulars on that of the United States and post-Thatcher Britain. 
Where only months before the government’s first attempt to destroy the 
Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) Australia’s wharfies11 were conducting go-
slows and work-to-rule on ships from Liverpool, and paid a tolerable fine when 
they subsequently defended their actions as employment-related issues at 
Australia’s idiosyncratic labor courts, it could now no longer apply such 
performances without risking bankruptcy, deregistration, and even criminal 
charges against its leaders.  As a result, we find the port workers of the MUA 
responding with a broad repertoire of citizen rights-based tactics to a crisis 
triggered by the government and employers in the late 1990s. 
 
Regime change and the decategorization of labor: The conservative Liberal 
Party’s historic long term in opposition during the 1980s and early 1990s fuelled 
intra-party contention between the established ‘Wet’ faction and the growing 
‘Dry’ faction, which introduced allies from non-traditional segments of capital and 
New Right think tanks. Winning the party room battles and then executive 
government power in 1996, the Dry faction and the Liberal Party’s coalition 
partner, the corporate farming linked National Party, proceeded to “out-source” 
its transport and industrial policy planning to selectively tendered consultants 
linked to all its new external allies in capital and the New Right. At the same 
time, it cast out organized labor from the policy making process established by 
the previous Labor government, namely the Prices and Incomes Accord, through 
which the union movement had achieved considerable social policy gains for 
workers in exchange for wage restraint at a time when the Labor Government 
was internationalizing Australia’s heavily protected industrial sector and financial 
system. 
 
                                                 
11 See Footnote 5. 
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The John Howard-led Liberal Governments’ resulting institutional reforms of 1997 
included first, a rolling back of the hallmark of antipodean corporatism, the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission12; second, an introduction of the 
“freedom of choice” not to join a union, thereby targeting powerful unions’ 
closed shop, upon which they had relied for control at the point of production; 
third, a wholesale transfer of legal bans on secondary boycotts from the purview 
of the labor courts and to the watch dog of the neo-liberal order, the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC); and, fourth,  a total banning of 
primary boycotts in matters affecting international trade, also now under the 
ACCC. Finally, the government cabinet secretly approved a document based on 
the recommendations of its preferred consultants to take an “activist approach” 
in triggering a dispute with the MUA. That activist approach, however, meant 
eliciting the general support of interested elements of capital, and the agreement 
of the stevedoring firms to trigger a dispute. The government found luke-warm 
support from most of the firms it approached, while one of the two stevedoring 
companies, P. and O., refused outright to trigger a dispute of any description, 
complaining that the governments’ new laws were not as watertight as Mrs 
Thatchers’ to warrant the risk. Locally expanding Patrick Stevedores, on the 
other hand, was interested and keen to start.   
 
Both the Government executive and Patrick fully expected the MUA and the 
Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) to engage their traditional labor 
repertoire, including performances such as strikes and sympathy strikes, against 
any provocation, and to thus fall foul of the new anti-labor Workplace Relations 
Act. But that is where the neo-liberalizing elites miscalculated, and badly. For the 
MUA, with the top leadership of the ACTU and state labor councils fully behind it, 
developed an array of performances based on the category of citizen, on the civil 
court system, and on the Common Law of Torts13, the Corporations Law, and the 
contradictions of the government’s new law.  
 
Innovation took time at first. During an early series of attacks against the union, 
the MUA national leader, John Coombs and his team focused on strategies 
designed to avoid the highly threatening domestic arena, where they had no 
doubt that the union’s traditional repertoire would only invite state repression. 
So, in September 1997, when one shipping agent announced that an 
approaching ship would use non-union labor, the MUA elicited the ITF’s and the 
ILWU’s threats of an international boycott. This succeeded in keeping the battle 
off-shore and away from Australia’s courts and police. Similarly, when John 
Coombs was leaked secret information about an attempt to send Australian 
military personnel to Dubai to train as a replacement workforce, he and the 
                                                 
12 A complex state and federal system of compulsory courts for conciliation and arbitration 
13 This notoriously anti-labor law in the Common Law tradition had been largely by-passed during 
the Twentieth Century by the characteristic institutions of antipodean corporatism, the Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission. 
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ACTU focused on activating the until then ambivalent Labor Party Opposition14 to 
investigate government involvement in the scheme, shame the government in 
Parliament, and use both the ITF’s and the Labor Party’s diplomatic connections 
with the United Arab Emirates to end the scheme before the non-union force was 
due to return to Australia.   
 
But when, in January 1998, Patrick Stevedores leased a berth at Melbourne’s 
Webb Dock to the National Farmer’s Federation to train non-union workers, the 
threatening domestic arena could no longer be avoided. Repertoirial innovation 
shifted into top gear: The MUA resisted its instinct to call for direct strike action 
in favor of a “Peaceful Assembly” at the Webb Dock gates that included off-duty 
workers from the MUA and allied unions. Traditional actions were not resisted 
with ease; but the MUA and ACTU leaderships convinced the MUA membership 
to apply its famed discipline towards an alternative, from which point other 
unions could not but respect the MUA’s choice and follow suit. Thus unionists in 
the construction, electrical, nursing, and entertainment industries applied their 
worker skills to construct quasi-carnival sites in place of the traditional industrial 
picket. And, as the weeks passed and the pickets were deemed safe, increasing 
members of the broader citizenry joined the assemblies, making them “Peaceful 
Community Assemblies”. But these sites, nevertheless, disrupted Patrick’s 
operation, attracted media attention to the protest, and helped the police 
privilege their right to maintain the peace over the Government’s and Patrick’s 
pressure to enforce law and order. During April’s national lockout, Melbourne’s 
successful innovations were quickly diffused to the rest of the country through 
industrial union structures and media coverage . 
 
Critical to the evolution of the citizen repertoire on the ground was first, the 
ACTU’s and MUA’s determination to avoid demonstrations that would increase 
engagement with the police and hence the chance of violent interactions15; and 
second, the MUA’s strong relationship of trust with ACTU Assistant Secretary, 
Greg Combet, a former employee of the MUA, and with the head of its unity pact 
union, the CFMEU’s16 John Maitland. But third, and most importantly, was the 
example and inventiveness of the Victorian Trades Hall Council (VTHC) and its 
unassuming leader, Leigh Hubbard, who had already had the experience of 
battling Jeff Kennet’s neo-liberalising state government of Victoria. For, following 
                                                 
14 The Labour Party was in disarray after its thumping electoral loss to the Howard Government. 
It was itself in the throes of a ‘Third Way’ shift, which included neo-liberalizing proclivities 
premised on drawing distance from the union movement. 
15 This was the result of a lesson hard learned: Just prior to the Howard Government’s first 
Budget, the ACTU had organized a mass demonstration outside Parliament House to protest the 
pending industrial relations reforms as well as proposed welfare cuts. Violence erupted at one 
corner of the demonstration under heavy police guard. The incident ended as a public relations 
disaster for the ACTU and a political coup for the government, which had repeatedly labeled 
unionists as thugs. 
16 The Construction, Forestry, Mining, and Energy Union 
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that state’s demolition of labor categorizing laws and institutions in the early 
1990s, the VTHC had embarked on a policy of building strong ties with social 
welfare centres, immigrant communities, small farming communities, and the 
churches, as well as engaging in concerted bridge building across the ideological 
chasm that was the Victorian labor movement. 
 
Innovation in the legal arena, however, was slower to develop, in part because 
of the speed and concentration of events on the ground, and in part because the 
legal arena had not been one that had needed much thought and inventiveness 
during the classical era of Antipodean Corporatism, during which the highly 
institutionalised labor tribunals framed tactics. It was not until a brazen, 
infuriated, and dedicated Melbourne labor lawyer, Josh Bornstein, called Combet 
at the height of the Webb Dock non-union training scheme that a new path was 
forged. A young lawyer ensconced in Melbourne’s Jewish legal fraternity, with its 
long and venerable tradition of civil and labor rights activism, Bornstein pointed 
to some critical contradictions in the new workplace laws that concerned the 
right to association. Coombs and Combet, realising the lacuna among their 
arenas of activity to date, decided to place their trust in Bornstein and let him 
formulate a legal strategy, providing it could accommodate the ‘peaceful 
community assemblies’. Bornstein’s legal team, in turn, started planning a case 
of illegal conspiracy against Patrick and the farmers, and against the government 
itself, and later assumed the services of a Queen’s Counsel experienced in the 
Common Law of Torts and the Corporations Law, and with intimate knowledge of 
the court’s extraordinary powers. To the extent that Bornstein’s team utilised the 
now comparatively emasculated industrial courts, it was largely to gather 
information—by means of subpoenas to the MUA’s enemies—for the larger 
conspiracy case the MUA would file for in the Federal Court17. 
 
The dispute escalated in April 1998 when, in the dead of night, Patrick-employed 
security firms raided all the country’s ports by land and sea and locked out all 
Patrick employees. The Minister for Workplace Relations, Peter Reith, 
immediately emerged from a late meeting in Parliament House to congratulate 
Patrick and announced a redundancy package to seal the mass sackings. The 
MUA, in turn, moved to nationalize and broaden the peaceful community 
assemblies; and its union allies in the VTHC and other regional councils trained 
the growing numbers in non-violent resistance and engaged civil rights lawyers 
to inform participants of their rights in the event of arrest. But critically, following 
the example of CFMEU leader John Maitland, rostered union leaders organizing 
the pickets--following their receipt of injunctions--“hat-switched” from the 
category of organized labor to return to the pickets as “citizens on a family day 
out”.  
 
                                                 
17 For an intricate tracing of the evolution of the repertoire and the expansion into new legal 
arenas, see Gentile 2009. 
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Unionists’ civil disobedience attracted more citizens to the Assemblies by the day 
and the process reached critical mass when Patricks obtained an injunction from 
the Supreme Court of Victoria against any and all persons present at the port 
gates. This “Ban the World Injunction” was immediately defied by the ACTU’s 
Executive, behind which rallied journalists, civil libertarians, and a host of 
affronted citizens, and it was successfully challenged in an appeal by the union, 
former premiers, Opposition parliamentarians who represented the port area, 
and prominent Australians. 
 
In the meantime, the union and its lawyers were also using the highest courts of 
the civil system. During that highly contentious month of April, they secured a 
ruling from the Federal Court of Australia that the union had “an arguable case 
of illegal conspiracy” against its employer, the farmers, and the government to 
dismiss workers for exercising their right to join an association (a union) of their 
choice. For, first, the lawyers had argued, while Minister Reith’s new law 
introduced a right not to join an association of choice, there was nevertheless a 
right to join an association of choice. Second, utilizing the traditionally anti-union 
Common Law of Torts, the lawyers argued that Patrick, the National Farmers 
Federation, and the Government executive had conspired to break the new law, 
while Patrick also abused the Commercial Law through a complex and secret 
company restructuring designed to make the illegal dismissals irreversible. In 
practical essentials the High Court of Australia then upheld the Federal Court’s 
ruling.  
 
But while most accounts of the dispute end with this victory and the wharfies’ 
march through the ports’ gates, the MUA still had its most ominous battle before 
it: that with the semi-autonomous Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC), whose brief it was to uphold and legally enforce the neo-
classical economic principle of competition between companies for the benefit of 
a ‘free market’ and consumers, and now, in effect, even competition between 
workers. This newly empowered institution was suing the MUA leadership for 
damages, including those incurred through a US West Coast solidarity blockade 
of non-union loaded cargo from Melbourne. 
 
Unbeknown to the MUA, the ACCC had been monitoring the MUA’s activities 
since a mere month after the Federal Cabinet secretly approved its 
‘interventionist strategy’—some nine months before the national lock out—and 
needed only show that the union leadership had in any way authorized or 
condoned the American longshore workers’ blockade during the union 
leaderships’ cross-Pacific phone conversations (which the ACCC had traced) for 
the union’s courtroom victories to have proven pyrric victories. Significantly, 
demonstrating the power of the neo-liberal state in coercing labor and in 
maintaining that anti-labor order, this body sought to chill international solidarity 
by suing Australian unionists and ITF Flags of Convenience Inspectors as 
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‘Australian citizens’ allegedly conspiring to break Australian boycott laws. In 
short, the ACCC was disciplining pro-worker citizens in the interests of pro-capital 
and pro-consumer citizens. 
 
Where American unionists have long relied on the strongly institutionalized Bill of 
Rights to counter such anti-labor coercion, the union movement in 
constitutionally weaker Australia now found itself at the limits of its own citizen 
rights domain—at least, institutionally. For politically their courtroom victories 
and the burgeoning community assemblies threatened the government with a 
full conspiracy trial during the following year’s election; while, with respect to 
Patrick, the worksite and courtroom contention had overdrawn the company’s 
finances beyond the point that its bankers would tolerate. Pressure on the ACCC 
was brought to bear and it settled with the MUA. The MUA lived on, and the 
Australian union movement, though now devoid of the political and institutional 
power resources through which it had helped deliver Australians their former 
social rights, now at least had proof of the power of the liberal domain of citizen 
rights18. 
 
B. Failing to Adapt in Britain 
 
Not so the Liverpool Dockers, or rather their union, the TGWU, and the British 
labor movement in the decade following Thatcher’s neo-liberal assault on the 
Britain’s post-war Keynesian social state. Having totally decategorized organized 
labor from the polity, both politically and institutionally, Thatcher’s neo-liberal 
revolution had delivered workers as individuals to their employers. But the British 
union movement’s response did little to change or subvert this. It failed to adapt 
its repertoire in response to the Thatcher government’s attack on the National 
Union of Miners, while, in 1989, the TGWU leadership responded to the abolition 
of the National Docks Labor Scheme with a cautious legalistic approach that 
meandered  through the myriad of anti-labor laws on those same laws’ terrain 
(see Turnbull et. al. 1992). This contributed to the loss of a national wave of 
dock protests, sealed by the union’s deregistration in all ports, bar two—one of 
which was Liverpool.  
 
The MDHC’s mass dismissal of the Liverpool Dockers in 1995 presented the 
TGWU and the British union movement with yet another occasion to seek new, 
regime-appropriate weapons of labor as well as, no less, a highly experienced 
                                                 
18 The Australian union movement has since involved itself in the campaign for an Australian Bill 
of Rights to strengthen citizen rights, at the same time as it has supported its familial party, the 
Australian Labor Party, in subsequent election campaigns in the hope of reversing its loss of legal 
rights and political influence. This last and more traditional effort focused on campaigning in the 
media and community during the 2007 election campaign against further Howard government 
industrial relations ‘reforms’. By so doing, the ACTU helped achieve a change of government, 
after which it focused on regaining some of its pre-Howard era categorical power as labor.  
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and motivated group of workers and local community to focus its come-back on. 
Again a regime-redundant option was preferred. Under Thatcher heir, Prime 
Minister John Major, some union leaders were now entertaining the possibility of 
‘social partnership’ as a mode of industrial exchange, while many others were 
pinning their hopes to a change of government so as to ensure it. Largely 
inspired by Germany’s ‘social partnership’ model and the term’s growing 
hegemony in European Union circles and the mainstream industrial relations 
literature, there was nevertheless neither the institutional foundation for ‘social 
dialogue’ between the ‘social partners’ in Britain, nor the incentive to develop 
them. For with laws that had served employees to their employers on a platter—
one by one—capital had no incentive to dialogue with unions, much less view 
them as ‘partners’. Some elements of the British union movement, however, 
were interested and wanted to prove their reliability as a social partner by 
showing its restraint. 
 
The TGWU refused to declare the Liverpool dispute official, fearing that this 
would put it at risk of the sequestration of its funds, and, as the campaign drew 
on, threaten a ‘New Labor’ victory. Under Bill Morris, the TGWU and its Executive 
refused to call for the support of the ITF or to field widely for advice on legal and 
tactical challenges, preferring instead to simply focus on a negotiated settlement 
with redundancy packages. There were, however, alternatives to such closure to 
innovation: While the TGWU had undergone a series of internal changes since its 
heyday under the legendary Liverpudlian, Jack Jones, its creatively militant 
tradition and cadres had not been defeated. And while Morris himself had little 
experience with ports, there were many at Transport House19 who did. Inside the 
TGWU were senior officers with intimate knowledge of the Liverpool region and 
strong ties of trust with the Liverpool Dockers; and some were also highly 
informed about the MDHC, and its expanding and vulnerable business interests 
and networks. But the new leadership denied these officers postings in the 
region or in the union’s docks section. When they tried to approach Morris with 
suggestions, they were barked back into their non-Liverpool posts and non-port 
affairs.  The point to underscore here is that it was not the union leadership’s 
ideological position that determined this closure—Morris, indeed, had been 
elected as the union’s Left candidate—but rather the problem lay in his and the 
executive’s refusal to seek and listen to alternative views and plans, and a 
determination to pull rank on those that tried to offer them. 
 
The TGWU leadership closed itself up to an inner circle and to the advice of in-
house lawyers. Liverpool, its workers and families, and their inventive community 
supporters, such as “Reclaim the Streets”, were seen, not as an opportunity for 
national union revival, but rather as a nest of militant trouble makers. Ironically, 
Transport House also hosted the long retired Jack Jones in an honorary office. 
                                                 
19 The TGWU’s headquarters in London. 
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The elderly Jones sat there during the long dispute, heart-broken and concerned 
that victories are denied to leaders who do not build trust with the membership 
and who do not see the membership and its communities as a resource. 
 
Ironically, according to the Liverpool Dockers’ post-dispute submission to the 
ILO, the TGWU leadership had in fact neglected to officially repudiate the dispute 
in the technically required manner, thereby leaving the dispute (at least 
arguably) official and itself open to the very litigation it had sought to avoid 
when it distanced itself from the Dockers’ demands for reinstatement. We do not 
have sufficient evidence to indicate whether the failure to formally repudiate the 
dispute was an oversight or not; however, as the union was clearly not 
supporting the Dockers’ demands for reinstatement, preferring instead to provide 
financial relief and negotiate a redundancy package, the employers did not turn 
on the union. 
 
The Liverpool Dockers did not simply appeal to its national leadership or wait for 
it to change its tack. They set off to build the largest transnational docker 
network and achieved the most widespread international days of action in docker 
history. Their networking also found powerful brokers among the national 
affiliates of the ITF, who in turn pressured and at times shamed Morris and the 
ITF secretariat. The pressure bore fruit when some TGWU insiders—unbeknown 
to Morris—secured a resolution in a union committee that was broad enough to 
hand to the ITF’s General Secretary, David Cockroft as an official call for action, 
resulting in a historic international day of action in January 1997. The ambush, 
however, was not sufficient to unlock the union leadership beyond that day—
Morris re-took control of the union and did not permit ITF imprimatur for a 
follow-up international day of action in September, much less an alternative 
domestic strategy. 
 
By late 1997, the Liverpool Dockers and their families were exhausted. Their 
historic two and a half years of struggle had taken a heavy toll. Most of them 
faced crippling debts, some had lost their homes, and the emotional and material 
strain had even taken five lives. The MDHC made its “final final” offer to the 
union, and Morris imposed a secret ballot on the Dockers. In January 1998, the 
Liverpool Dockers voted to accept a settlement based on redundancies and 
permission to form their own labor supply company. The dispute was over, and 
lost. Lost on domestic not international turf, because the union leadership had 
failed to build trust with its membership, on one hand, and, on the other, it had 
refused to open itself up to alternatives to its traditional labor repertoire beyond 
a defensive and defeatist legalism.  
 
Lost above all during the Liverpool Campaign was a prize opportunity to 
spearhead a reversal to British labor’s decade and a half of pounding losses. For 
here was, in the words of one TGWU insider, “every union leader’s dream”: a 
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highly motivated, creative and militant workforce with the full support of its 
community. Significantly, the mobilization of the city of Liverpool by the Dockers 
and Women of the Waterfront had included performances from the citizen 
repertoire—demonstrations, consumer boycotts, rallies, community-supported 
pickets, church alliances across the religious divide, and some daring alliances 
with civil activists. And their picketing tactics were also in constant evolution: To 
disrupt the miles of dockland and avoid arrest, they organized surprise pickets at 
different gates and times each day, while the Women of the Waterfront often 
applied their gender power to disrupt the port’s entry, e.g., by stuffing their 
clothing to simulate pregnancy and then challenge the police to ‘man handle 
them if they dared’. But that repertoire was never nationalized by the TGWU 
across the port and related industries, nor across those communities where the 
union had lost members but still had social networks to build back from.  
 
Similarly, while the Liverpool Dockers had fielded legal experts who produced 
challenging papers for submission to the ILO, their national union did not take 
these up or inject that initiative into exploring non-labor-related British laws. 
Instead, the TGWU and the Trades Union Congress pinned their hopes on the 
incoming Labor Government of Tony Blair and his union-diminishing Third Way 
to electoral victory.  
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
Drawing on evidence from the responses of OECD port unions in neo-liberal and 
corporatist regimes to the Liverpool Dockers’ Campaign for reinstatement, and 
on the Australian union movement’s response to regime change to a neo-liberal, 
we have argued that: 
 
 The structures of labor rights and citizen rights in a given capitalist 
political economy shape labor’s repertoires of action in responding to 
threats of globalization, even in this most globalized of industries; 
 
 In neo-liberal regimes, such as the USA, where labor’s political and 
institutional categorization is weak, labor is thrown back to the citizen 
rights that it shares with other groups of citizens to enable its actions of 
resistance and solidarity; 
 
 In corporatist regimes such as Sweden, where labor’s political and 
institutional categorization is strong, labor has little need to retreat to its 
citizen rights or to alliances with non-labor groups but uses established 
labor rights and alliances with other workers to enable its actions of 
resistance and solidarity; 
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 Those union movements that survive the transition from a corporatist to a 
neo-liberal regime will do so by adapting their strategies to the citizen 
rights domain; those that fail to shift to a citizen repertoire will fail and 
weaken. 
 
 Successful innovation within an established repertoire in a stable 
environment, and successful innovation of the entire repertoire in cases of 
regime change from a corporatist to a neo-liberal regime are contingent 
on networks of trust between the union’s leadership and the membership, 
and, most crucially, upon union leaders’ openness to outsiders and 
externally-connected insiders experienced with non-labor contention. 
 
 In the course of regime change from a corporatist capitalist regime to a 
neo-liberal capitalist regime, while social democracy as represented by 
labor’s categorical inclusion in the capitalist polity is diminished, liberal 
democracy remains largely intact to assist workers in struggle.20 
 
So where did the “Race to the Bottom” thesis, as specified by Tilly in 1995  err? 
Certainly not in suggesting that globalization—especially in its neo-liberal 
avatar—threatens labor’s rights. That is clearly the case. But domestic history, 
domestic institutions, and domestically rooted popular contention—including that 
which strategically utilizes the international arena—still determines the course of 
labor struggles.  
 
Tilly missed the critical variety of capitalist regimes, largely because his thesis 
over-determined state dissolution and government powerlessness. In the 
process, he failed to disaggregate the various domains of rights won in historical 
episodes of popular contention, and also failed to accord organized labor the 
strategic ability to shift between the domains that threaten it and the domains 
that provide it with opportunity. 
 
Regime change from a corporatist to a neo-liberal regime, as in Britain and 
Australia, did not simply involve de-institutionalization and deregulation, nor did 
it leave a policy vacuum; rather the process also involved a re-regulation towards 
new labor-coercive institutions that diminished the categorical power of workers, 
leaving largely their category of citizen and its sustaining legal and political 
institutions their major recourse. Moreover, neo-liberal globalization passed 
through governments rather than over them. The process of state transformation 
                                                 
20 Though beyond the purposes and possibilities of this paper, we also note that in fact the 
functioning realm of citizen rights in the neo-liberal state is the one realm that distinguishes the 
neo-liberal state from authoritarian regimes, where both labor and citizen rights are curtailed. 
Moreover, during periods of war, when neo-liberal governments roll back citizen rights, labor 
loses its main prop and hence curtails its militancy until such time as a concerted citizen 
protection and anti-war movement is in full mobilization (see Gentile 2002 and 2009). 
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was critically dependent on changing polity alliances within and across executive 
achieving parties in party-government systems. Both Margaret Thatcher’s 
Conservative Party and John Howard’s Liberal Party would have been 
unrecognizable to their party antecedents. Once intra-party contention 
transformed those parties, their respective electoral victories sealed the process 
of regime change to neo-liberalism. For those parties’ leaders to then claim, 
‘There is no alternative’ was more than self-serving. But nor did labor contention 
necessarily prove them right. 
 
Three major implications can be inferred from our findings, regarding social 
movement theory, transnational mobilization, and globalization. 
 
Social movement theory: Our work has emerged from within the broad political 
process approach to contentious politics that Tilly himself did much to found. 
That approach departed from  previous collective behaviour and socio-economic 
approaches to focus on the impact of variables such as political opportunities and 
threats, resources and ways of framing contention. It was originally specified at 
the domestic level and therefore has come in for criticism from scholars who 
believe that globalization erases once-important differences in domestic 
structures.  
 
These criticisms are well taken but while it is true that the political process 
approach grew up within national precincts prior to the current age of 
globalization, we think it has served us well in understanding the variations in 
unions’ reactions to the same transnational episode of contention: precisely 
because domestic structures matter – and vary --  American, Swedish, Australian 
and British port workers responded to neo-liberal threats with visibly different 
combinations of performances from the broad repertoire of contention. We think 
that efforts to respecify the political process approach at the transnational level – 
as has recently been done by international relations scholars like Kathryn Sikkink 
(2005) and sociologists like Tamara Kay (2006) will bear more fruit than an 
approach which sees globalization as the master process driving all ships in the 
same direction. 
 
Transnational Mobilization: Much of this work has focused on networks and 
organizations created explicitly for transnational mobilization, such as the World 
Social Forum, the European Social Forum and the Chiapas solidarity network. 
These instances of transnational mobilization are important and the research 
they have inspired is beginning to break down the walls among social 
movements and social movement researchers on various continents. But in 
focusing so heavily on dedicated transnational organizations, they elide an 
important sector of transnational cooperation and mobilization: the solidarity of 
organizations created for domestic struggles which respond to international 
threats through domestically-focused campaigns. Our work has centered on a 
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union movement – port workers – who are particularly imposed upon by 
globalization. Would our findings apply as well to other sectors? That question is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but we think that more domestically rooted 
unions would, if anything, be more conditioned by domestic rights regimes than 
the one we have studied. 
 
Globalization and Transnational Collective Action:  For rather than being 
dissolved by globalization, we have seen such activists and organizations 
activating a number of mechanisms and processes in domestic politics, 
mechanisms such as the internalization of international conflicts, the shift in scale 
from the transnational to domestic arenas, and the framing of domestic class 
conflicts in transnational terms.  And when they do so, they have to respond to 
the peculiar combinations of labor rights and citizen rights in their respective 
countries. Globalization is surely threatening labor’s rights, as Tilly correctly 
foresaw; but labor will only fail if it does not seize the combinations of political 
opportunities and dominant rights domain available to it in its national polity, as 
Tilly would certainly have agreed.  
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